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RESPONSE 
ACCESS TO COUNSEL, RES JUDICATA, 
 AND THE FUTURE OF HABEAS AT GUANTANAMO 
STEPHEN I. VLADECK† 
In response to Andrew Kent, Essay, Do Boumediene Rights Expire?, 
 161 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 20 (2012), http://www.pennumbra.com/ 
essays/10-2012/Kent.pdf. 
INTRODUCTION 
As Professor Andrew Kent explains, the recent litigation over whether 
noncitizens detained at Guantanamo have a continuing right of access to 
counsel once their habeas petitions have been denied or dismissed is just the 
tip of the iceberg.1 These cases raise a host of challenging questions about 
not only the rules governing the Guantanamo detainee litigation or the 
future of U.S. detention policy, but also the nature of the Constitution’s 
Suspension Clause2 more generally.3 Professor Kent’s analysis provides 
 
† 
Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Scholarship, American University Washington 
College of Law. Although I served as co-counsel on an amicus brief in support of the petitioner in 
Boumediene, the views expressed herein are mine alone. 
1 See Andrew Kent, Essay, Do Boumediene Rights Expire?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 
20, 20 (2012), http://www.pennumbra.com/essays/10-2012/Kent.pdf. 
2 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not 
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”). 
3 See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit After Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1451 (2011) (summarizing the D.C. Circuit’s jurisprudence in Guantanamo habeas cases 
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008), which 
held that the Suspension Clause “has full effect” at Guantanamo). 
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useful insight on these complex issues, especially his recognition of the 
significance of Chief Judge Lamberth’s September 2012 decision reaffirming 
that the government cannot interfere with Guantanamo detainees’ access to 
counsel, even for those who have already had their day in court.4 
But inasmuch as Professor Kent’s essay suggests that the recent contre-
temps provoking Judge Lamberth’s ruling present the larger question of 
whether “Boumediene rights expire,”5 I argue in this Response that this is, in 
fact, not the real question implicated by the current Guantanamo litigation. 
As I explain in Part I, if Boumediene was rightly decided, it must necessarily 
follow that the federal courts have jurisdiction not only to entertain habeas 
petitions, but also to protect that jurisdiction by policing the ability of 
detainees to file future petitions. And, whereas Congress and the Supreme 
Court have imposed some limits on the relitigation of substantive claims in 
post-conviction habeas cases, Part II suggests why, contra Professor Kent, 
res judicata categorically does not apply in the context of challenges to 
executive detention. Instead, the important questions going forward (to 
which I turn in Parts III and IV) will focus on the merits of potential 
successive habeas claims, including whether the government’s detention 
authority might wane over time, and whether detainees’ rights under 
domestic and international law will become more salient as time goes on. 
I. WHY BOUMEDIENE “RIGHTS” CANNOT “EXPIRE” 
Professor Kent’s essay begins with the proposition that in Boumediene, 
the Supreme Court recognized a new “right” to habeas corpus for at least 
some noncitizens detained outside the territorial United States.6 In fact, 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was careful not to couch its holding in 
terms of individual rights.7 Instead, the Court focused on the separation 
of powers, holding only that the Constitution’s Suspension Clause “has 
full effect” at Guantanamo.8 Thus, the federal courts must be open to hear 
 
4 See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Continued Access to Counsel, No. 12-398, 2012 WL 
4039707, at *18 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2012) (holding “that petitioners have an ongoing right to access 
the courts and, necessarily, to consult with counsel”); Kent, supra note 1, at 32-33 (discussing the 
Obama Administration’s curious litigation position on the access-to-counsel issue). 
5 See Kent, supra note 1, at 21. 
6 See Kent, supra note 1, at 20-21. 
7 Virtually all of the Boumediene majority’s references to “rights” are to the claims detainees 
might vindicate through their habeas petitions. See, e.g., 553 U.S. at 743, 745 (describing the 
Suspension Clause as an “instrument,” “means,” or “device” to protect “individual libert[ies]” and 
“the rights of the detained”). 
8 Id. at 771. 
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the detainees’ challenges to the lawfulness of their detention, whether 
via habeas corpus or an adequate alternative.9 Quite pointedly, the 
Boumediene majority did not go on to hold that noncitizens detained at 
Guantanamo actually have any constitutional rights that might bear on 
the merits of their habeas petitions; it held only that the courts must be 
open to whatever legal challenges the detainees could raise.10 
This distinction, which Professor Kent and I have debated before,11 is 
hardly semantic. After all, the question raised in a habeas petition is not 
just whether the challenged detention violates the petitioner’s rights; it 
is whether the detention is lawful—a question that turns as much on the 
government’s underlying authority to detain as it does on any individual 
right not to be detained.12 In the post-conviction habeas context more 
familiar to legal practitioners, a detainee typically uses habeas to collat-
erally challenge his underlying conviction or sentence. As such, the 
distinction between government authority and individual rights will 
often collapse, since the conviction and sentence are the sources of the 
government’s ongoing detention authority. Thus, so long as neither the 
conviction nor the sentence is constitutionally infirm, post-conviction 
habeas relief will generally (albeit not always) be unavailable.13 But in 
 
9 For more on the separation-of-powers theme of Justice Kennedy’s analysis, see Stephen I. 
Vladeck, Boumediene’s Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 2107, 2109 (2009). 
10 See, e.g., 553 U.S. at 795 (“Our decision today holds only that petitioners before us are 
entitled to seek the writ of [habeas corpus].”). 
11 Compare, e.g., Andrew Kent, Boumediene, Munaf, and the Supreme Court’s Misreading of the 
Insular Cases, 97 IOWA L. REV. 101, 103 (2011) (asserting that in Boumediene, the Supreme Court 
embraced “global constitutionalism” by extending the Constitution’s substantive protections to 
non-citizens overseas), and Andrew Kent, Habeas Corpus, Protection, and Extraterritorial Constitu-
tional Rights: A Reply to Stephen Vladeck’s “Insular Thinking About Habeas”, 97 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 
34, 35-36 (2012), http://www.uiowa.edu/~ilr/bulletin/ILRB_97_Kent.pdf (same), with Stephen I. 
Vladeck, Insular Thinking About Habeas, 97 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 16, 18-19 (2012), 
http://www.uiowa.edu/~ilr/bulletin/ILRB_97_Vladeck.pdf (arguing that Professor Kent’s reading 
of Boumediene is belied by both the language of Justice Kennedy’s opinion and its subsequent 
application in the lower courts). 
12 See generally Jared A. Goldstein, Habeas Without Rights, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 1165, 1181 
(arguing that “habeas relief can be based on individual-rights claims” but that these claims can also 
be based on the illegality of the detention itself). 
13 See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400-02 (1993) (explaining that habeas claims 
challenge the constitutionality of a conviction, not its correctness, and that even when a conviction 
was arguably wrong, it cannot be overturned through habeas). But see id. at 437 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that there should be no bar to the assertion of an actual innocence claim in a 
habeas petition because “it violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to execute a person 
who is actually innocent”); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 430-31 (1963) (“The jurisdictional 
prerequisite [in habeas cases] is not the judgment of a state court but detention  
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the executive-detention context, almost every case brought both before 
and after September 11 has involved a claim that the government lacked 
the authority to detain, not that the otherwise valid detention was in 
violation of the detainee’s individual rights.14 As these cases demon-
strate, habeas can still be tremendously effective even for detainees who 
cannot specifically invoke any individual “rights.” 
This formulation matters because it helps to undercut the idea that 
the right to challenge continued physical detention ever “expires.” Even 
if the initial detention is lawful, circumstances may change in a manner 
that materially affects the legality of the continuing detention; so long 
as an individual remains in custody, the Constitution protects his ability 
to challenge that custody in court. And although this result usually 
follows from the federal habeas statutes,15 Boumediene necessarily com-
pels the same conclusion, even in cases in which Congress has with-
drawn the statutory jurisdiction of the federal courts (so long as the 
Suspension Clause applies). 
II. HABEAS CORPUS AND RES JUDICATA 
The above discussion explains why Chief Judge Lamberth was cor-
rect to hold that the federal courts continue to retain jurisdiction over 
current and future habeas petitions filed by Guantanamo detainees.16 
The harder question, at least superficially, is whether the litigation of a 
detainee’s initial habeas petition is in any way preclusive of his ability to 
bring a second or successive claim, and thus, whether jurisdiction in 
these cases is an empty formalism to preserve claims that are patently 
unavailing on their face. 
 
 
simpliciter. . . . Habeas lies to enforce the right of personal liberty; when that right is denied and 
a person confined, the federal court has the power to release him.”). 
14 But see, e.g., Al Warafi v. Obama, 409 F. App’x 360, 361 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam) 
(remanding a detainee’s habeas petition for consideration of his claim that his detention is 
foreclosed by his rights as a medic under Article 24 of the First Geneva Convention). 
15 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006) (authorizing habeas relief for detainees who are “in 
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”). 
16 See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Continued Access to Counsel, No. 12-398, 2012 WL 
4039707, at *18 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2012) (“In the case of Guantanamo detainees, access to the 
courts means nothing without access to counsel. And it is undisputed that petitioners here have a 
continuing right to seek habeas relief. It follows that petitioners have an ongoing right to access 
the courts and, necessarily, to consult with counsel.”). 
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As Professor Kent rightly concedes, at common law, res judicata did not 
apply to habeas claims.17 Writing for the Court in Sanders v. United States, 
Justice Brennan explained that  
[i]t has been suggested that this principle derives from the fact that at 
common law habeas corpus judgments were not appealable. But its roots 
would seem to go deeper. Conventional notions of finality of litigation have 
no place where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional 
rights is alleged. . . . The inapplicability of res judicata to habeas, then, is 
inherent in the very role and function of the writ.18 
To that end, even after Congress invested the federal circuit courts 
with appellate jurisdiction in habeas cases in the Habeas Corpus Act of 
1867,19 the Court continued to hold that res judicata generally did not 
preclude relitigation on the merits in habeas petitions of claims that 
were litigated in the underlying criminal trial (or in a prior habeas 
petition).20 Although the Justices did adopt judge-made constraints on 
relitigation deemed abusive, the basis for such an “abuse of the writ” 
doctrine was the petitioner’s misconduct and deliberate manipulation of 
the judicial system, not the preclusive nature of the original adjudication 
on the merits.21 To that end, the Court in Sanders itself held that the 
then-extant version of 28 U.S.C. § 2244—which appeared to incorpo-
rate res judicata into the post-conviction context—did not actually do 
so.22 Rather, the Sanders Court concluded that the statute “permitted,” 
but did “not compel[]” district judges to refuse to entertain second or 
successive habeas petitions23 so long as “the petition present[ed] no new 
ground not theretofore presented and determined, and the judge or 
court [wa]s satisfied that the ends of justice will not be served by such 
 
17 See Kent, supra note 1, at 29 (citing Steve Vladeck, Habeas, Res Judicata, and Why the New 
Guantanamo MOU is a Big Deal, LAWFARE (July 17, 2012, 5:13 PM), http://lawfareblog.com/ 
2012/07/habeas-res-judicata-and-why-the-new-guantanamo-mou-is-a-big-deal). 
18 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963) (internal citations omitted). 
19 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)). 
20 See, e.g., Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 230 (1924) (stating that the rule that res judicata does not 
bar relitigation through a writ of habeas corpus of previously resolved merits claims is “well established”). 
21 See, e.g., Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239, 241 (1924) (holding that the plaintiff 
abused the writ of habeas corpus by failing to present evidence at trial so he could present it in a later 
petition); see also Ex parte Cuddy, 40 F. 62, 65-66 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1889) (”[W]hile the doctrine of res 
judicata does not apply, it is held that the officers before whom the second application is made may 
take into consideration the fact that a previous application had been made to another officer and 
refused; and in some instances that fact may justify a refusal of the second.”).  
22 Sanders, 373 U.S. at 11-12. 
23 Id. at 12. 
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inquiry.”24 Pointedly, the Sanders Court construed § 2244 to avoid the 
“serious constitutional questions” that the statute would have raised 
had it been interpreted to otherwise codify res judicata and thereby 
“derogate from the traditional liberality of the writ.”25 
To be sure, when Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),26 it came closer to incorporating 
res judicata into post-conviction habeas litigation by both requiring 
federal courts to defer to most state court legal rulings on the merits,27 
and imposing far tighter restrictions on the ability of those in custody 
pursuant to state court convictions to bring second or successive 
challenges to their conviction via habeas.28 But neither of these 
measures expressly incorporated res judicata into the post-conviction 
context, and even still, the Supreme Court was careful to interpret 
these provisions to preserve at least some availability of continuing 
habeas relief in order to avoid constitutional questions.29 
Nevertheless, Professor Kent suggests that the federal courts 
“would not seem to be foreclosed by the Boumediene decision or any 
strong policy arguments” from applying res judicata (or at least the 
abuse-of-the-writ doctrine) to Guantanamo detainees’ habeas claims.30 
In fact, the Boumediene Court was at pains to emphasize the fundamen-
tal differences between Congress’s power to circumscribe the scope of 
habeas review of state court convictions and its comparable power vis-
à-vis federal executive detention. As Justice Kennedy put it, 
 
24 Id. at 11 n.5 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244). 
25 Id. at 11-12. 
26 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. code). 
27 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006) (stating that the federal court should not grant a writ of 
habeas corpus with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless 
the decision by the state court “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”); see also 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000) (interpreting § 2254(d)(1) to authorize habeas 
relief only if the state court (1) “arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a 
question of law;” (2) “decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially 
indistinguishable facts;” or (3) “identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court’s 
decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case”). 
28 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (stating that a habeas petition raising an already-litigated issue 
“need not be entertained” by a federal court). 
29 See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 661-62 (1996) (holding that the Court’s ability to 
entertain “original” habeas petitions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) vitiated any constitutional 
question that AEDPA’s constraints on second or successive habeas petitions might otherwise have 
raised regarding the Court’s appellate jurisdiction). 
30 Kent, supra note 1, at 30. 
11 Vladeck.docx (DO NOT DELETE) 12/7/2012 9:53 AM 
84 University of Pennsylvania Law Review PENNumbra [Vol. 161: 78 
 
[w]here a person is detained by executive order, rather than, say, after being 
tried and convicted in a court, the need for collateral review is most press-
ing. A criminal conviction in the usual course occurs after a judicial hearing 
before a tribunal disinterested in the outcome and committed to procedures 
designed to ensure its own independence. These dynamics are not inherent 
in executive detention orders or executive review procedures. In this  
context the need for habeas corpus is more urgent. The intended duration 
of the detention and the reasons for it bear upon the precise scope of the 
inquiry. Habeas corpus proceedings need not resemble a criminal trial, even 
when the detention is by executive order. But the writ must be effective. 
The habeas court must have sufficient authority to conduct a meaningful 
review of both the cause for detention and the Executive’s power to detain.31 
This contrast, between post-conviction habeas petitions and habeas peti-
tions seeking review of executive detention, should be only that much more 
relevant with regard to the preclusive effect of the initial habeas proceeding. 
After all, detention in the post-conviction context is for a finite period, 
usually determined at the time of conviction, and the overwhelming 
majority of claims for post-conviction relief contest the underlying validity 
of the conviction (or sentence) itself. In that context, it is less likely that the 
resolution of the same claim will differ based upon when—or how often—it 
is relitigated. In contrast, in the context of executive and other noncriminal 
detention, the length of detention is not fixed ab initio, and the same source 
of detention authority may, in fact, apply differently as time goes on. 
Consider in this regard the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning 
the constitutional limits on noncriminal detention, whether civil commit-
ment,32 pre-trial confinement,33 or detention of noncitizens facing deporta-
tion.34 In each of these contexts, the Court has held that due process 
requires both an individualized showing of current and future dangerousness35 
 
31 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 783 (2008). 
32 See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360-69 (1997) (examining the constitutionali-
ty of involuntary confinement for those who are “dangerous or mentally impaired”). 
33 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (reviewing the constitutionality of 
pre-trial confinement for arrestees who “pose a threat to the safety of individuals or to the 
community which no condition of release can dispel”). 
34 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001) (discussing the constitutionality of pre-
deportation confinement of noncitizens). 
35 Id. at 690-91 (explaining that the Court has “upheld preventive detention based on dan-
gerousness only when limited to specially dangerous individuals” (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 
368; and Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747, 750-52)). 
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and a period of detention that is limited to a “reasonable” duration.36 As 
such, one could easily imagine a scenario where the exact same claim—that 
a noncriminal detainee’s continuing incapacitation is unlawful—might have 
a different answer at different times. 
This is all a long way of saying what should have already been clear be-
fore Boumediene: whatever limits Congress and the Court may have recog-
nized on second or successive habeas petitions in the post-conviction 
context, it is much harder to justify those limits on either legal or policy 
grounds in the context of ongoing executive detention. Indeed, precluding 
those who have a nonfrivolous basis on which to relitigate a previously 
unsuccessful challenge to their ongoing, noncriminal detention raises the same 
“serious constitutional questions” to which Justice Brennan alluded in Sanders.37 
III. THE POTENTIAL MERITS OF SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE 
GUANTANAMO HABEAS PETITIONS 
Of course, if the justification for allowing this kind of potentially open-
ended relitigation is the idea that the merits of a detainee’s challenge to his 
continuing, noncriminal detention might change, then the real question 
raised by the Guantanamo cases going forward is whether noncitizens whose 
habeas petitions have already been dismissed or denied might ever be able to 
raise viable challenges to their continuing detention. What little the Supreme 
Court has said on the matter suggests that the answer will typically be no.  
For example, in Ludecke v. Watkins, the Court held that the Alien Enemy 
Act of 1798—which authorizes the President to detain noncitizen adults 
present in the country who are “natives, citizens, denizens or subjects” of a 
country at war with the United States38—continued to authorize the 
detention of German nationals by the United States in 1948, more than 
three years after Germany’s unconditional surrender ended World War II 
in Europe.39 Writing for a 5–4 majority, Justice Frankfurter explained that 
 
36 In some circumstances, the Court has expressly quantified what a reasonable duration 
would be. See, e.g., Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701 (holding that, absent special circumstances, the Due 
Process Clause forbids the government from detaining a noncitizen for longer than six months 
while his or her deportation is pending without a significant likelihood that the noncitizen will be 
deported in the foreseeable future). 
37 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 12 (1963); see also supra text accompanying notes 22-25.  
38 An Act Respecting Alien Enemies, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798) (codified as amended at 
50 U.S.C. § 21 (2006)). 
39 Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 166-69, 171-73 (1948) (reasoning that a cease-fire does 
not allow the courts to declare that hostilities have terminated, and holding that the Alien Enemy 
Act validly delegated such a determination to the President). 
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the question of when a war was over was reserved for the political branches 
regardless of what was true on the ground.40 Thus, the petitioners would 
not be entitled to habeas relief unless they were detained after the cessation 
of hostilities had been formally declared by the political branches.41 Ludecke 
may therefore suggest that noncitizens who have had their day in court 
according to Boumediene will not have a viable challenge to their continuing 
detention until the political branches formally recognize a cessation of the 
hostilities initiated by Congress’s September 2001 Authorization for the 
Use of Military Force (AUMF).42 Especially in light of the AUMF’s 
reaffirmation in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2012 (NDAA),43 it seems unlikely the political branches will declare an end 
to these hostilities anytime soon.44 
At the same time, there is at least some language in the Supreme 
Court’s 2004 decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld hinting that this issue may not 
be so clearly settled.45 There, the Court agreed with the petitioner—a U.S. 
citizen captured in Afghanistan—that the AUMF did not authorize “indefi-
nite detention for the purpose of interrogation.”46 Moreover, the Court 
interpreted the scope of the AUMF’s “necessary and appropriate force” 
provision, from which it derived the government’s detention authority, 
according to law-of-war principles.47 Because American soldiers were still 
 
40 See id. at 166 & n.10, 170. 
41 See id. at 168-69 & n. 13; see also United States ex rel. Jaegeler v. Carusi, 342 U.S. 347, 348 
(1952) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s power to remove the petitioner under 
the Alien Enemy Act expired when Congress officially ended the war with Germany). 
42 See Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note) (authoriz-
ing the President “to use all necessary and appropriate force against” those who “planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided” the September 11 attacks). 
43 See Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1021(b)(2), 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011) (authorizing the detention of 
those responsible for September 11 as well as those who “substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, 
or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners”). 
44 See Stephen I. Vladeck, Ludecke’s Lengthening Shadow: The Disturbing Prospect of War Without 
End, 2 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 53, 53 (2006) (discussing the possibility that the “‘war’ on 
terrorism may never end” and the legal ramifications of such an enduring conflict). But see Charlie 
Savage, Pentagon Counsel Speaks of Post-Qaeda Challenges, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/us/politics/pentagon-counsel-looks-ahead-to-post-qaeda-legal-
challenges.html (quoting a speech by Defense Department General Counsel Jeh Johnson in which he 
suggested that we may soon reach “a tipping point at which so many of the leaders and operatives of 
Al Qaeda and its affiliates have been killed or captured and the group is no longer able to attempt or 
launch a strategic attack against the United States, such that Al Qaeda as we know it, the organization 
that our Congress authorized the military to pursue in 2001, has been effectively destroyed,” thereby 
raising difficult questions concerning the government’s continuing detention authority). 
45 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
46 Id. at 521 (plurality opinion). 
47 See id. 
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involved in “[a]ctive combat operations against Taliban fighters,” those 
principles necessarily supported the conclusion that “necessary and appropri-
ate force” included the power to detain those captured on the battlefield.48 
That said, Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality, sounded an important 
note of caution. In her words, “If the practical circumstances of a given 
conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the  
development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel. But that is 
not the situation we face as of this date.”49  
In light of this discussion in Hamdi, one might argue that, if there comes 
a point when no ground troops are involved in “active combat operations” 
in Afghanistan (or elsewhere), then the detention authority provided by the 
AUMF may expire, even without a formal announcement to that effect by 
the political branches.50 At the very least, this argument is far from frivolous. 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DETAINEES’ 
RIGHT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL 
Another possibility is that, as it has with other forms of noncriminal 
detention, the courts will eventually hold that the Due Process Clause 
places limits on the type and length of detentions that are otherwise lawful. 
The D.C. Circuit has already held, after Boumediene, that the Due Process 
Clause does not apply at Guantanamo.51 But a host of commentators 
 
48 See id. 
49 Id. 
50 This argument is bolstered by the fact that the detention authority conferred by the 
AUMF (and the NDAA), unlike the Alien Enemy Act, is directly tethered to the laws of war, 
which authorize only the detention of enemy combatants until the cessation of an “armed 
conflict.” See id.; Marty Lederman & Steve Vladeck, The NDAA: The Good, the Bad, and the Laws 
of War—Part II, LAWFARE (Dec. 31, 2011, 4:48 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/12/ 
the-ndaa-the-good-the-bad-and-the-laws-of-war-part-ii (“[T]he detention authority conferred by 
the AUMF, as ‘affirmed’ by the NDAA, must be understood with reference to the laws of war. 
Importantly, this construction should govern not only habeas cases going forward, but also the 
detention practices of future administrations.”); see also United States v. Hamdan, 696 F.3d 1238, 
1248 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (underscoring the significance of statutes that “explicitly incorporate[] 
international norms into domestic U.S. law”). 
51 See Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba I), 555 F.3d 1022, 1026-27 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that 
the Due Process Clause does not apply to noncitizens abroad), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1235, 1235 
(2010) (per curiam) (holding that new developments regarding offers to detainees to resettle in 
other countries required rehearing in the lower court), reinstated on remand, (Kiyemba III), 605 
F.3d 1046, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (finding that the new developments did not affect 
the proper outcome of the case), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1631 (2011). 
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(including me) have strongly criticized the D.C. Circuit’s decision,52 and a 
number of subsequent decisions in Guantanamo cases have implied that 
the Due Process Clause could apply.53 Especially as military commissions 
begin issuing decisions on the merits,54 it seems likely that the due process 
question will be revisited given the fundamentally different interests 
implicated in criminal, as opposed to civil, proceedings.55 As such, it is 
more than possible that federal courts will recognize at least some consti-
tutional protections for the Guantanamo detainees, whether under the 
Due Process Clause or other provisions. 
This is where Chief Judge Lamberth’s opinion settling the access-to-
counsel dispute becomes so intriguing.56 The government precipitated the 
decision by requiring at least some counsel, notably those whose detainee 
clients’ habeas petitions had been dismissed or denied, to sign a new “Memo-
randum of Understanding” (MOU).57 This document imposed far stricter 
limits on their ability to meet (and communicate) with their clients.58 It also 
limited their ability to challenge the terms of the MOU, ostensibly on the 
ground that such contacts became less significant once the individual detainee 
 
52 See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941, 972 
(2011) (reviewing PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 
(2010)) (explaining the extent to which the court in Kiyemba I failed to appreciate the broad 
historical scope of a habeas court’s equitable powers). 
53 See, e.g., Al-Madhwani v. Obama, 642 F.3d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that even if 
the petitioner had a constitutional right to due process and the district court violated it by relying on 
evidence outside of record, such error would be harmless); Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba II), 561 F.3d 
509, 518 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (assuming that Guantanamo detainees 
have the same constitutional rights with respect to their proposed transfer as did U.S. citizens in a 
previous case); cf. United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 278 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (Baker, C.J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the result) (explaining how Boumediene alters the analysis courts should use in 
determining the extraterritorial scope of constitutional rights and that “law overseas should not be 
applied in a formalistic manner, but in a practical and contextual manner”). 
54 See, e.g., United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1323 (Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. 
2011) (upholding a military commission’s verdict that the defendant provided material support to 
terrorism and approving the sentence), rev’d, 696 F.3d at 1249-52 (reversing the conviction 
because “material support to terrorism” was not recognized as a violation of the international laws 
of war at the time of the defendant’s relevant conduct). 
55 Cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result) (arguing 
that the process that is due should vary as between criminal fines, criminal convictions resulting in 
prison terms, and capital cases). 
56 In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Continued Access to Counsel, No. 12-398, 2012 WL 
4039707 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2012). 
57 See Benjamin Wittes, A New Battle Over GTMO Attorney Access, LAWFARE (July 11, 2012, 
4:22 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/07/7995 (reporting on the government’s insistence 
that lawyers for detainees sign a “highly-restrictive memorandum of understanding”). 
58 Id. 
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had received his day in court.59 The lawyers objected, arguing that the MOU 
interfered with their clients’ right of access to counsel, and thus, with their 
right of access to the courts.60 Chief Judge Lamberth agreed:  
The Court has an obligation to assure that those seeking to challenge their 
Executive detention by petitioning for habeas relief have adequate, effective 
and meaningful access to the courts. In the case of Guantanamo detainees, 
access to the courts means nothing without access to counsel. And it is un-
disputed that petitioners here have a continuing right to seek habeas relief. 
It follows that petitioners have an ongoing right to access the courts and, 
necessarily, to consult with counsel. . . . The Court, whose duty it is to 
secure an individual’s liberty from unauthorized and illegal Executive con-
finement, cannot now tell a prisoner that he must beg leave of the Execu-
tive’s grace before the Court will involve itself. This very notion offends 
separation-of-powers principles and our constitutional scheme.61 
What is most revealing about this analysis is Chief Judge Lamberth’s un-
derexplained assumption that detainees’ right of access to counsel follows from 
their right of access to the courts. Shortly after the Supreme Court’s 2004 
decision in Rasul v. Bush that federal courts had statutory jurisdiction to hear 
habeas petitions from Guantanamo detainees,62 the D.C. district court recog-
nized the detainees’ right of access to counsel, but only under the federal habeas 
statute.63 No court has revisited the question since Congress overruled Rasul and 
revoked most federal courts’ statutory jurisdiction over Guantanamo in the 
Detainee Treatment Act of 200564 and the Military Commissions Act of 
2006.65 But, one may well argue that the right of access to counsel is simply 
part and parcel of the individual’s right to a “meaningful” opportunity to 
challenge the legality of his detention, which is what the Supreme Court held 
 
59 Memorandum of Understanding Governing Continued Contact Between Counsel/ 
Translator and Detainee Following Termination of the Detainee’s Habeas Case no. 8(f) (n.d.), 
available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Post-Habeas-MOU.pdf. 
60 See Wittes, supra note 57. 
61 In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Continued Access to Counsel, 2012 WL 4039707, at *18. 
62 See 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004). 
63 See Al Odah v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2004) (holding that 28 
U.S.C. § 2254, when read together with 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2), “provides this Court with the 
discretionary authority to have counsel represent Petitioners in the habeas context”). 
64 See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680, 2741-
44 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006)). 
65 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2635-
36 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)). 
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the Suspension Clause to require in Boumediene.66 So construed, access to 
counsel would be necessary to vindicate the Boumediene Court’s understanding 
of the Suspension Clause and would therefore follow from the Court’s holding 
that the Suspension Clause “has full effect” at Guantanamo.67 If so, this would 
be an important development, albeit one limited to habeas cases. 
In every other context, however, the Supreme Court has assessed a liti-
gant’s right of access to counsel according to traditional due process analy-
sis,68 presumably because such a right both transcends challenges to ongoing 
physical confinement and is more comfortably understood as an individual 
right than as a structural protection. Because the purpose of access to 
counsel is to allow litigants to avail themselves of subsequent legal process 
regardless of the nature of their underlying claim, it appears at once to be 
both procedural and individual. As Justice Stevens put it, “Access to counsel 
for the purpose of protecting the citizen from official mistakes and mis-
treatment is the hallmark of due process.”69 And so, unless the right of 
access to counsel could be traced simultaneously (or independently) to both 
the Due Process Clause and the Suspension Clause,70 the real significance of 
Chief Judge Lamberth’s analysis may be the implicit but necessary conclu-
sion that the detainees do have at least a modicum of due process rights. If 
such a conclusion is given fuller explication, it would introduce new 
grounds pursuant to which Guantanamo detainees—and others in similar 
situations—might seek to relitigate their underlying detention claims. 
Either way, Chief Judge Lamberth’s opinion suggests that there is far 
more work to be done in fleshing out the full extent of the Constitution’s 
applicability in the Guantanamo cases. 
 
66 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) (“[T]he privilege of habeas corpus entitles 
the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous 
application or interpretation’ of relevant law.” (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001))). 
67 Id. at 771. For a much fuller explication of this argument and of the otherwise underappre-
ciated relationship between Boumediene and the Supreme Court’s access-to-courts jurisprudence, 
see generally Vladeck, supra note 9. 
68 See, e.g., Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 332-34 (1985) (summa-
rizing cases in which the Court has recognized a litigant’s right to—or right of access to—counsel). 
69 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 465 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
70 There is a complex relationship between the Due Process Clause and the Suspension 
Clause. See Joshua Alexander Geltzer, Of Suspension, Due Process, and Guantanamo: The Reach of the 
Fifth Amendment After Boumediene and the Relationship Between Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 14 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 719, 776 (2012) (concluding that the Court’s interpretation of the relation-
ship between the two clauses will hinge on whether the Court applies Boumediene’s “impracticable 
and anomalous” test or instead uses the separation-of-powers approach); Martin H. Redish & 
Colleen McNamara, Habeas Corpus, Due Process and the Suspension Clause: A Study in the Founda-
tions of American Constitutionalism, 96 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1375-87 (2010) (examining the limits that 
the Due Process Clause imposes on the Suspension Clause). 
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It is tempting to think that none of this would matter if President 
Obama had fulfilled his pledge to close Guantanamo71 or that the issues 
raised by Professor Kent’s Essay are simply legacy problems confined to a 
small, unique, and eventually vanishing class of cases. But so long as the 
government continues to claim the power to subject certain terrorism 
suspects to long-term military detention under the laws of war, the question 
of whether (and to what extent) such detainees are entitled to continuing 
judicial review will matter, even if they are imprisoned at locations other 
than Guantanamo.72 As I suggested above, Chief Judge Lamberth was 
clearly correct that, in cases in which the Suspension Clause “has full 
effect,” the federal courts have continuing jurisdiction to supervise executive 
detentions. In this context, the Suspension Clause gives the federal courts the 
power to protect the detainees’ right of access to counsel to facilitate the 
filing of future claims, even for those detainees seeking to relitigate prior 
challenges to the same detention. Whether or not such access will make any 
difference going forward depends entirely on whether the government’s 
detention authority wanes—or whether the detainees’ claims under domes-
tic or international law ripen—over time.  
It is to these queries, and not to the question of whether “Boumediene 
rights expire,” that we should direct our focus. 
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71 See William Glaberson & Helene Cooper, Obama’s Plan to Close Prison at Guantánamo May 
Take Year, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2009, at A1. 
72 See, e.g., Maqaleh v. Gates, Nos. 06-1669, 08-1307 & 08-2143, 2012 WL 5077483, at *12 
(D.D.C. Oct. 19, 2012) (holding that noncitizens detained at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan are 
not entitled to pursue habeas relief, even where the detainees were neither arrested in, nor citizens 
of, Afghanistan). 
